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When Cook entered the Pacific, he entered into transactions or 
exchanges which established "interest" relationships between himself 
and individual political figures in what were generally, at the time, 
autonomous Pacific cultures. These exchanges included material items 
and genetic and other kinds of information, and they led not only to 
wider knowledge of the Pacific by the metropolitan powers but to a 
wider knowledge of outsiders and of each other by the islanders them-
selves. Yet it seems to have been a lack of knowledge of each other's 
real and potential power that led to the final misunderstanding at 
Kealakekua. 
My paper concerns not Cook, but the complexity of the contemporary 
political economy of the Pacific and what appears to me to be a lack 
of knowledge and understanding of the relative amount of real and poten-
tial power:'held on the one hand by emerging island political groupings 
and on the other by the metropolitan powers with Pacific interests. 
The paper is thus a call for a rethinking of the relationships of metro-
politan and Pacific cultures and the ways in which changing "interests" 
and "dependencies" may influence a Pacific future. 
In the last two decades moves of political independence in the con-
text of economic dependence have been made. The next two decades will 
see shifting interests and dependencies. It is obvious that Pacific 
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Islanders themselves will take a much more outspoken and active role 
in planning programs of local and national social and economic devel-
opment while seeking an elusive "Pacific Way." It is probable that 
Pacific Islanders may also adopt third world political symbols and make 
increasing efforts to actually or symbolically avoid the dependencies 
of perceived neocolonialism. 
The worldwide regularities that followed the economic expansion 
of industrial Europe (Bodley, 1975) and its derivative nation states 
(Anzus and Japan) as well as the peculiarities of the penetration of 
private and public interests into the Pacific need no enumeration here. 
Spoehr's (1966) call for studies of the Pacific as a wbole or re-
gion continues to have relevance. If we as obseLVers are to offer any 
understanding of future directions in the region, we must develop ana-
lytical approaches that facilitate an understanding of continuing metro-
politan interests, of developing local and regional interests and of 
the networks and acts of decision by which complementary and conflicting 
interests are articulated. 
The social sciences, and in particular my own discipline, anthro-
pology, have just begun the task of trying to understand the integration 
and interdependence of all the seemingly autonomous cultural systems 
that have occurred since Cook. Worldwide systems of communication and 
trade are only part of this integration for it includes quite varied 
"interest" and "dependency" relationships. 
The island Pacific may be considered both as a region and as an 
interest area. I choose the term "interest area" to emphasize contin-
uing metropolitan interests, interests of the islanders in the metro-
poles, and a growing recognition of "common interests" between island 
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and cultural groups. I believe that we need more adequate analytical 
models of interest relationships and power relationships before we can 
hope to truly understand how dependency and interdependency affect the 
contemporary Pacific scene. Competing theories or approaches to eco~ 
nomic and social development exist and many of the basic terms and con-
cepts (including those in this paper) remain poorly defined and diffi-
cult to operationalize. Though caution is advised, we should not let 
caution prevent us from making a few preliminary definitional attempts, 
even if they cannot be easily empirically grounded. 
"Interests" develop from contacts and interchange of information 
about the potential use of resources controlled by the respective parties 
to the interest relationship_ Parties to interest relationships may 
be individuals, cultural and social groups, territories, regional orga-
nizations or nation states. 
From exchange theory we note that the simplest or basic interest 
relationships are two party relationships. Exchanges between the parties 
forge a linkage or network of potentially continuing interchange, and 
such networks may serve as mechanisms of distribution not only of resources 
and information but of power. The "interests" of each party may be 
latent or manifest. The particular interests of a single party may 
complement and/or contradict each other, as may the particular interests 
of any two or three parties. 
Interests may also vary from time to time and situation to situa-
tion in the relative importance of political, economic, strategic and 
even nationally or culturally symbolic identity needs. "Interest" 
relationships are by their very nature relationships of power in which 
one party to the relationship has come to consider the other as being 
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within its domain of influence, yet power relationships are reciprocal 
and never completely one-sided. The dependent or subordinate party 
always has partial control over some physical, social and/or symbolic 
resources which are of interest to the dominant party. For our purpose, 
power in social relations may be defined after Adams (1970) as the rel-
ative amount of tactical control that one party holds over the eaviron-
ment of another party. It may also be conceived of as the level of 
potential cost that party A may choose to induce for party B given B's 
dependence on A for resources. It is important to make a distinction 
between direct power which comes from having direct control over resources 
(land, labor, technology) and derived power which comes from an ability 
to gain tactical access to power sources at higher levels of articulation 
in the system. The term level of articulation is chosen to emphasize 
the increased number of units that can affect power transfers within 
a complex network of interdependency ties. 
Ties that transfer power may be sources of integration as well as 
conflict for the parties in the network. Social anthropology has tended 
to emphasize the functionally integrative nature of such exchanges. 
Yet cultural evolutionary approaches have begun to emphasize the poten-
tial for competition and conflict over power sources. As different 
levels of articulation are considered the networks become rapidly more 
complex and the relative amounts of power and interest of the different 
parties are much more difficult to observe and measure. 
Logically, two or more subordinate power units may find themselves 
within the power domain of a single supraordinate unit and rather than 
pooling their direct power may compete for derived power from the supra-
ordinate. Subordinate units may also pool both direct and derived power 
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in order to increase the flow of derived power to themselves as a new 
intermediate unit. By pooling direct power, intermediate units may 
buffer the effects of supraordinate power centers and may also be able 
to manipulate subordinate units by permitting downward derived power 
flows. 
Subordinate units may also attempt to enter into new exch~ges with 
other power centers in order to derive new power buffers or to raise 
themselves to a higher position or an intermediate level of articulation. 
This may give the units more power over subordinate constituents. Yet, 
since intermediate power units are subordinate themselves, they may 
generally only do this successf~lly when the action does not manifestly 
conflict with the interests of the dominant power upon which they are 
dependent. And it may be a simple matter, of course, for a supraordinate 
unit to alternate its release of power to subordinates in order to keep 
them in competition and thus in balance. 
Current actors within the contemporary Pacific political scene, 
if we use this kind of modeling, may be understood as brokers who attempt 
to gather more power from both supraordinate and subordinate power units 
in order to control and influence, if not expand their own domains. 
Studies of brokerage may improve our understanding of the management of 
conflict and cooperation at intermediate levels of articulation yet we 
need to develop models which can assess the relative amounts of power 
at upper and lower levels. 
We need to recognize that both conflict and cooperation character-
ize interdependency and that observers ~ specify their nature in each 
series of transactions rather than assuming that interests of dominant 
parties are either uniform or must necessarily conflict with those of ~ ~ 
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subordinates. Certainly. France's interests are not uniform for her 
different Pacific territories nor do they parallel the interests of other 
dominant pewer units in the Pacific, such as New Zealand or the United 
States. 
In observing power and interest relationships we must also examine 
in detail the varying linkages between the parties and the nature and 
"interests" of the power units themselves. It is only by a mest careful 
analysis of the network of connections and the relative amounts of real 
power controlled by parties to interest relationships in the Pacific 
that we will be able to gain real understanding of the possibilities 
for economic and social development. 
Brookfield (1975) has suggested that we may be entering a conceptual 
revolution, or if you will, a paradigm shift or rethinking of how devel-
opment and underdevelopment come about. Let us hope so, because our 
present ideas about development seem underdeveloped, if not simply ide-
ological. A simplistic contrast may be made between the orthodox approaches 
to modernization which assume that the expo~t of aid (capital, technology 
and managerial expertise) will allow the lesser developed units (which 
are generally subordinates in interest relationships) to catch up to 
the developed ones. The alternative and less orthodox approach assumes 
automatically that it is the dependency of the subordinate units in an 
interest relationship that keeps them underdeveloped. It does appear that 
after two decades of development under United Nations auspices the smaller, 
less developed, island territories seem even farther behind. 
Is there then a linkage between development in the metropolitan 
industrial power units and dependency and underdevelopment in the sub-
ordinate units? If so, we have yet to completely understand its nature. 
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Dependency models or approaches imply such a direct linkage so that 
development in metropoles (the dominant parties in interest and power 
relationships) generates underdevelopment in satellites. This view is 
commonly associated with native Latin American scholars looking northward 
(Furtado, Frank) though a logically similar view was originally expressed 
by Gunnar Myrdal in the 1950's. Such a view could be readily adopted by 
many Pacific Islanders today. It is a view with ideological and political 
significance yet it may be no less objective in a scientific sense than 
the more orthodox view. 
Metropole-satellite models are often applied to dependency relation-
ships and they are as logically simple as the model of power and interest 
relations stated above. Following such a model, it was only after the 
downward flow of derived power and a decline in the manifested "interests" 
of the Spanish, German and English metropoles that their former satellites 
(the Anzus nations) could become new metropoles with their own satellites. 
Fiji and Papua New Guinea may well, through secondary development (Adams, 
1967), soon emerge as important intermediate metropoles for the region. 
Yet it may simply be too simplistic to characterize the ties between 
metropolitan interests and Pacific cultures as ones of simple dependency 
and continuing underdevelopment. It might indeed be argued that since 
Cook, the world has in an evolutionary sense reached a new level of inte-
gration, complexity and interdependence which we have yet to understand 
completely. 
Cardoso (Kahl, 1976) has recently criticized the use of metropole 
satellite models by referring to "crude dependency theory." He argues 
that simplistic use of dependency models implies that real power and 
decision-making are concentrated in the dominant metropoles. If particular 
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cases are examined in detail, individual political figures of particular 
dependent areas appear to exhibit a range of optionality and independent 
choice in their decision-making. The range of such choices may be narrow 
or broad depending on the particulars of the situation and the manifested 
power of the dominant unit. 
Political spokesmen in the emerging island states find themselves 
able to utilize varying mixtures of direct and derived power in confron-
tations with the supraordinate units. As Adam has noted "strength without 
purpose invites low level political maneuvering." It is not only variety 
but inconsistency in the manifested interest of the dominant metropolitan 
powers which allows such flexibility. 
Perhaps we can better understand such recent political events as 
Somare's visit to China, Nakayama's visit to Japan, and Tongan negotia-
tions with the Soviets as being the results of attempts to gain new sources 
of derived power. 
These individuals are power brokers who are articulate, politically 
effective spokesmen for the constituent interest units within their own 
power domains. The flow of power to them will allow them to control more 
effectively (or at least appease) lesser power units beneath them. 
The emerging regional centers, while politically independent, remain 
economically and militarily dependent on supraordinate power centers. We 
must therefore ask to what degree choices may be made that come into manifest 
conflict with the latent "interests" of the more powerful metropoles. 
Such choices or decisions imply a rationally conscious assessment of the 
power units. This will require develo~ing models that can include, there-
fore, each actor's definition of the situation -- which implies a rational 
recognition of his relative power. 
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Power relationShtps in the Pacific can no longer be simply conceived 
as two-way exchanges between satellites and metropoles. Regional power 
units are emerging to buffer metropolitan "interests" and to coordinate 
and unify domains by extending derived power to satellite unitso Regional 
organizations such as S.P.E.C. and the University of the South Pacific 
may well lead to more economic cooperation and less competition, yet even 
these organizations depend to a degree on derived power from interested 
metropolitan parties. 
Recent moves by the Soviets and Chinese within a worldwide context 
of d~tente may substantially modify the post World War II "structuring" 
of power relationships in the Pacific$ They have the potential of becoming 
new sources of derived power for the emerging Pacific states. The size 
and resources of Pacific island groupings remain small in comparison to 
the developed metropolitan power centers with continuing "interests" in 
the region. Even though new resources presently in the control of Pacific 
groups may become important in the future, they will generally require 
technology and capital from the metropoles for their exploitation. Perhaps 
it is in recognition of continuing economic dependency that there has 
been so much recent political emphasis on social development and '~e 
Pacific WaYq" 
While ncrude dependency theory" may become ideologically attractive, 
it seems inadequate as a tool for understanding. Only by a refined devel-
opment of models and analytical understanding of the real limits and real 
options of power brokers, at different levels of articulation can we hope 
for real understanding (rather than misunderstanding) in the Pacific in 
the third century after Cook. 
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